UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/770
6 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With regard to the letter dated 30 August 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires of the "Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations" addressed to your predecessor (S/1995/757), I have the honour to inform you, on behalf of my Government, that the Croatian Army units did not launch any attack on the territory of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" - neither on 28 August 1995 nor at any time before or after that date. Being committed to the peace process, in particular at this very important stage, Croatia does not have any intention to raise the tensions on the Croatian-"Yugoslav" border near Dubrovnik.

From the enclosed map of the area in question it is visible that the location of Prasna Rupa - for which Mr. Djokić states that it lies "approximately 500 metres deep into the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" - is at approximately 1,100 metres inside the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both from the border of the Republic of Croatia with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the border of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Djokić's letter, the last in the series of similar unfounded and untrue allegations and accusations, therefore confirms once again that the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" lay claim to territory of other Member States, including the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This transpires from letters by Mr. Djokić to the Secretary-General (A/50/352-S/1995/693 and Corr.1 and 2). Croatia, in its letter of 28 August 1995 (A/50/389-S/1995/745), requested that the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" officially, unequivocally and in a timely manner state that no such claim or policy of the Belgrade Government exists. To the knowledge of my Government, no such statement has yet been made.

I would kindly request your assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative


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Pelimova br.
Dunave Krajnice
Bukovine
Ljubavka
(Mrcine)
Brajkovići
Kapetnik
Gradac
1073
Petrovići
Tušnica
Pahe Brdo
Karašovići
Papica most
Gunjina
Vidov vrh
Lastavica
Jasikovac
Zapresjeka
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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/771
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995 and 1011 (1995) of 16 August 1995,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 25 August 1995 (S/1995/761) on the establishment of a commission of inquiry,

Having also considered the note verbale of 10 August 1995 from the Government of Zaire to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/683) and welcoming the proposal of the Government of Zaire contained therein for the establishment under the auspices of the United Nations of an international commission of inquiry and its offer to assist such a Commission,

Recognizing that destabilizing influences in the Great Lakes region, including the illegal acquisition of arms, can be prevented by the cooperative efforts of all Governments concerned,

Expressing once again its grave concern at allegations of the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo imposed under its resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995), and underlining the need for Governments to take action to ensure the effective implementation of the embargo,

Underlining the importance of regular consultations between the Commission of Inquiry and the countries concerned, as appropriate, in view of the necessity to respect the sovereignty of States in the region,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an International Commission of Inquiry, with the following mandate:

(a) To collect information and investigate reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995);

(b) To investigate allegations that such forces are receiving military training in order to destabilize Rwanda;

(c) To identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces, contrary to the Council resolutions referred to above; and

(d) To recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion in violation of the Council resolutions referred to above;

2. Recommends that the Commission to be appointed by the Secretary-General be composed of five to ten impartial and internationally respected persons, including legal, military and police experts, under the Chairmanship of an eminent person, and assisted by the appropriate support staff;

3. Calls upon States, relevant United Nations bodies, including the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994), and as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations, to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the Commission, and requests them to make this information available as soon as possible;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission, and further requests him to submit, within three months from its establishment, an interim report on the conclusions of the Commission and, as soon as possible thereafter, to submit a final report, containing its recommendations;

5. Calls upon the Governments of the States concerned in which the Commission will carry out its mandate to cooperate fully with the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the Commission for security, assistance, and access in pursuing investigations, including:

(a) Adoption by them of any measures needed for the Commission and its personnel to carry out their functions throughout their respective territories with full freedom, independence, and security;

(b) Provision by them of all information in their possession which the Commission requests, or is otherwise needed to fulfil its mandate, and free access for the Commission and its staff to any relevant archives;

(c) Freedom of access at any time, for the Commission and its staff to any establishment or place as they deem necessary for their work, including border points, airfields, and refugee camps;

(d) Appropriate measures to guarantee the safety and security of the members of the Commission and guarantees from the Governments of full respect for the integrity, security and freedom of witnesses, experts and any other persons working with the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate;

(e) Freedom of movement for members of the Commission, including freedom to interview any person in private, at any time, as appropriate;

(f) The grant of relevant privileges and immunities in accordance with the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations;

6. Recommends that the Commission begin its work as soon as possible and to this end requests the Secretary-General to pursue his consultations with the countries of the region;

7. Calls upon all States to cooperate with the Commission in facilitating its investigations;

8. Encourages States to make voluntary contributions to the Secretary-General's United Nations Trust Fund for Rwanda as a supplement to financing the work of the Commission as an expense of the organization, and to contribute through the Secretary-General equipment and services to the Commission;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/772
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the command of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Following the usual consultations, I wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint Major-General Rufus Modupe Kupolati of Nigeria as Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The post has been vacant since December 1993. Major-General Kupolati is expected to take up his functions at the beginning of October.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

95-27149 (E) 070995 080995

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/773
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 1 September 1995 (S/1995/772) concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Rufus Modupe Kupolati of Nigeria as Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Francesco Paolo FULCI
President of the Security Council

95-27155 (E) 070995 080995

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/774
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 29 August 1995 (S/1995/762) concerning recent developments in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They believe your letter provides a synopsis of political and humanitarian problems facing the region. They share your concern at the continued gravity of the situation and underline the need for a coordinated and effective response from the international community. The members of the Security Council therefore express their support for the initiatives you are undertaking, as described in your letter, and look forward to their implementation. The members of the Council will continue to monitor closely future developments in the area.

(Signed) Francesco Paolo FULCI
President of the Security Council

95-27161 (E) 070995 080995

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/775
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Croatia on 31 August 1995 issued the Decree on Temporary Taking-over and Administration of Specified Property. This Decree relates to houses, apartments, agricultural property, commercial buildings and business premises and other immovable structures, as well as vehicles, vessels, equipment, etc., that have been abandoned and relinquished in the reintegrated parts of Croatia by their legitimate owners, who have left Croatia and have settled in the occupied territories of Croatia, in occupied territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the territory of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

The Decree provides a legal basis for protection and administration of abandoned property, to prevent its looting, alienation, exchange or other depreciation or destruction. The ownership rights guaranteed by the Constitution are fully and unconditionally preserved under this Decree, which only places the abandoned property under the administration of the State until such time that the legitimate owner returns and claims his ownership.

This represents yet another attempt by the Government of the Republic of Croatia to fully restore law and order in the reintegrated territories.

I would kindly request your assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-27131 (E) 070995 080995

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/776
7 September 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris N. Yeltsin, on 7 September 1995.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

95-27168 (E) 070995 070995 080995

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Annex

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation dated 7 September 1995

The ongoing NATO air strikes and artillery shelling of the Bosnian Serbs undermine efforts for a political settlement. They go beyond the limits of United Nations Security Council decisions and draw the international community into a conflict against one of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia.

While declaring its "peacekeeping mission", the North Atlantic alliance has, in fact, usurped the role of both the judge and the bailiff.

Should such a policy continue to be pursued, we will have to carefully weigh, in the light of circumstances, our strategy, including our approach to relations with the North Atlantic alliance.

The time left to reach political solutions is critically short, yet there is still time.

The Russian side will actively contribute to the effectiveness of the meeting in Geneva with the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia under the auspices of the Contact Group. For my part, I intend to continue energetically promoting the search for political solutions.

What is most important now is to abandon the reflex use of force for a balanced approach and collective actions at the negotiating table. There is a clear understanding of this in Moscow; our partners should also understand it.

I am calling upon all those interested in a settlement to realize the seriousness and significance of this moment.

B. Yeltsin

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/777
7 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to express utmost concern regarding the inconsistencies displayed by the competent authorities within the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in establishing the facts following the explosion in the vicinity of the Markale market in Sarajevo, whereupon many civilians were killed or wounded.

The unusually prompt investigation and the report of the United Nations officials on the ground singled out the Bosnian Serb side as the one responsible for this crime. The initiative of the political authorities of the Republic of Srpska and the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Mladić, that a joint commission consisting of the representatives of the United Nations, the Serb side and the Muslim side be set up, was rejected. The events that followed culminated in the unprecedented and relentless "retaliation" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces against the Bosnian Serbs with far-reaching and serious consequences, loss of life and extensive material damage.

Scepticism relating to the UNPROFOR reports has been especially heightened following the explicit report of Colonel Demurenko, in which it is said that the culprits for the "Markale crime 2" should not be sought on the Serb side, i.e., that the chances that the Serbs were responsible are only theoretical, with a 1:1,000,000 margin.

According to the Reuters news agency report No. 52176 of 2 September 1995, the statement made for the press by Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Vernon of 2 September 1995 further corroborates those suspicions. It says that "Demurenko is not the only one to have challenged the official version of the event". During the same press conference, C. Vernon also indicated that there were a number of reports of vital importance for establishing the facts that reached United Nations Headquarters, including the one made by the officers in Sarajevo and two originating from the United States of America, but those were never revealed.

It should be recalled that this is not the first time that such events are being orchestrated on the eve of crucial negotiations on the establishment of

peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina or important decisions for the resolution of the crisis in those territories. For example, the shelling of Sarajevo following the so-called "breadline incident" in May 1992, the explosion in the Sarajevo cemetery during the funeral of orphans in August 1992 and the shelling of the Markale market in February 1994 were aimed at undermining the resumption of the peace process and providing an excuse for those who advocate the war option. It should be emphasized that the culprits for any of the above tragic incidents have not been definitely identified, that the UNPROFOR reports at the time have been questioned by the experts and severely criticized as dubious by the world media. Most importantly, they have never been publicized. Nevertheless, then as today, an in-depth investigation by joint teams of experts has never been conducted. However, without clear-cut proofs, the retaliatory measures against the Bosnian Serbs were undertaken as well as against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by introducing the sanctions against it.

In view of the above facts, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demands that the investigation to establish the true culprits for the latest shelling in the vicinity of the Markale market, which served as a pretext for the unprecedented NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets, be immediately initiated and that all reports which reached the United Nations in this regard be circulated and made public with a view to establishing the accurate facts.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/778
8 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the "Demand of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop the bombardment of the Republic of Srpska", adopted by the Federal Government on 7 September 1995.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

95-27285 (E) 080995 090995

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Annex

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia energetically demands from the Security Council of the United Nations that the bombardment of the Serb positions and other targets in the Republic of Srpska be immediately stopped. That would eliminate the danger of a possible escalation of the conflict in former Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the threat to international peace and security in the entire region for which the Security Council is directly responsible under the Charter of the United Nations.

The continuation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes and the actions of the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) represent a direct attack on the ongoing negotiations and the announced peace initiatives supported and accepted by the Republic of Srpska. It also seriously threatens the steps taken so far with a view to finding a peaceful and just solution to the crisis in former Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

It is unacceptable and incomprehensible to continue with air and other attacks and push for the negotiations and peace at the same time, particularly when it is well known that the leadership of the Republic of Srpska accepted the negotiations and demonstrated readiness to continue with the efforts, together with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, towards finding a solution acceptable to all parties to the conflict. Such military actions cannot possibly contribute to peace. Military intervention of the United Nations and NATO exclusively against one side encourages the other sides to the conflict to undertake military actions, which plays into the hands of those who advocate the war option and thus initiates a chain reaction with unforeseeable consequences that may be difficult to avert.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia therefore demands that the Security Council of the United Nations undertake most resolute and urgent measures in order to halt immediately air and other NATO attacks and thus create the conditions for the resumption of negotiations and a return to the so-much needed peace.

Belgrade, 7 September 1995

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/779
8 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of Council resolution 1002 (1995) of 30 June 1995. It covers developments since my report of 19 May 1995 (S/1995/404) and is divided into six main sections. Sections II and III deal with the identification process and other aspects of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1). Section IV provides an update of the activities of the military and civilian police components of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Section V discusses financial aspects. Section VI contains my observations and recommendations.

II. IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

A. Communications with the parties

2. Following the return of the Security Council mission to the region, the Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO), Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 23 June 1995, in which he announced the decision of the Frente POLISARIO to suspend its participation in the identification process and to withdraw its observers. The decision was taken in protest against the sentencing by a Moroccan military tribunal on 21 June 1995 of eight Saharans to prison terms of 15 to 20 years for having participated in a demonstration in Laayoune on 11 May 1995; and the announcement by Morocco to the Security Council mission of its intention to present for identification the 100,000 applicants residing outside the Territory.

3. On 26 June, Mr. Erik Jensen, who has since been confirmed as my Acting Special Representative, was invited to meet with the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Mr. Driss Basri, and other senior officials in Rabat. The Minister urged that planning begin without delay to identify the 100,000 applicants

currently resident outside the Territory, for whom the full computerized information was being provided to MINURSO. He stressed that his Government stood ready to assist MINURSO in every practical way, including the opening of additional centres, in Morocco and in the Territory. My Acting Special Representative confirmed that MINURSO was technically able to undertake the identification proposed. Were this action to be approved, he suggested opening centres where the applicants resided, so that there need be no movement of population. However, he informed the Minister that such a decision would be counter to the earlier agreed procedure.

4. On 26 June, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco, Mr. Abdellatif Filali, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in response to the decision by the Frente POLISARIO to suspend its participation in the process. The letter stated that Morocco could not accept an indefinite postponement of the referendum and called upon the Security Council to "take all necessary steps to ensure the resumption of the process with a view to holding the referendum on schedule". It also informed the Council that Morocco had transmitted to MINURSO the diskette containing the names of applicants residing outside the Territory and was cooperating fully with the mission to ensure that those applicants could be identified as soon as possible.

5. On 12 July, Mr. Jensen met with Mr. Filali. On 15 July, he met again with Mr. Basri and other senior Moroccan officials. The authorities reiterated their wish to proceed as expeditiously as possible in completing the identification process. They also agreed to the Security Council's call, in its report of 21 June (S/1995/498, para. 46), for "the Government of Morocco to conduct preliminary vetting of the 100,000 applicants currently not residing in the Territory prior to the examination by the Identification Commission, in order to enable MINURSO to maintain its timetable for completing the identification process". It was confirmed that this process would be completed before the end of August. This is reported as having been done, although a formal submission has yet to be received by MINURSO.

6. Also on 12 July, the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and myself. In his letter, he reiterated the view of the Frente POLISARIO that "the 1974 Spanish census constitutes the only basis recognized in the settlement plan as accepted by the two parties and endorsed by the United Nations" and deemed unacceptable what he termed "the participation of a substitute population, sought by the occupying Power, whose most recent manoeuvre was to attempt to include 100,000 of its nationals in the voters list". Nevertheless, he confirmed the Frente POLISARIO's agreement to resume its participation in the identification process after a Moroccan royal edict of 9 July had reduced the 21 June prison sentences to one year. His message was conveyed by the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, Mr. Bachir Mustafa Sayed, at a meeting with the members of the Security Council on 13 July.

7. On 3 August, Mr. Basri visited the MINURSO identification centre in Laayoune. Afterwards, in the presence of Moroccan Ministers and senior officials, as well as the media, he presented Mr. Jensen with two letters confirming his Government's commitment to proceed as expeditiously as possible

with the identification of all remaining applicants. He emphasized his Government's readiness to assist in opening 40 new centres in Morocco and in the Territory and providing MINURSO with all the necessary technical and logistic support.

8. At a meeting in the Tindouf area on 4 August, my Acting Special Representative discussed with the POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO the question of identifying applicants outside the Territory. Mr. Bachir reiterated the Frente POLISARIO's view regarding the unacceptability of many of the latest applicants being brought forward for identification, most especially the 100,000 applicants not residing in the Territory.

9. On 7 August, the Frente POLISARIO conveyed orally to MINURSO its decision that it would no longer participate in the identification, even within the Territory, of the tribal groups classified as "Chorfa", in addition to those classified as Northern tribes (Tribus del Norte) and Coastal and Southern tribes (Costeras y del Sur), until the following conditions had been met: (a) the provision of a complete list of all the applicants under the three groupings and (b) their classification by subfraction, the criteria under which they were applying and their actual residence. It insisted that it had accepted a compromise last year only on the understanding that those three groupings constituted a minority. It suggested that identification of the three groups be left till the end of the process, after the less contentious cases had been completed. This is, in fact, what MINURSO has done in the planning for identification.

10. On 25 August in Lisbon, I received the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, Mr. Ahmed Snoussi, who delivered to me a letter dated 23 August from the Prime Minister. In his letter, Mr. Filali reiterated Morocco's conviction that all applicants should be treated equally and were entitled to be presented for identification. He rejected any notion that there was a hierarchy of criteria and that applicants under criteria one to three were more legitimate Saharans than those under criteria four and five. He also explained the reasons why a large number of Saharans had not resided in the Territory at the time of the 1974 census and argued against excessive reliance on the census, which he maintained was open to challenge in various respects.

B. Progress and problems in identification

11. The identification operation recommenced in late July, after the details concerning its resumption had been clarified and practical measures taken to reopen the identification centres. The operation has since been suspended from 9 to 11 August, for the Mouled holiday, and from 19 to 26 August, during the Ninth People's Congress of the Frente POLISARIO.

12. A total of over 53,000 persons have been identified since the process began one year ago. More than 17,000 of these applicants have been identified since my last report (S/1995/404). Altogether, this represents over 40 per cent of persons residing in the Territory and over 51 per cent of those in the refugee camps near Tindouf. As shown in annex I, the number of applicants convoked exceeds the number of applicants actually identified. Of those remaining to be

identified, the great majority are covered by a detailed plan of work which has been submitted to the parties and generally agreed upon. The identification of these persons has been programmed. All the applications received from within the Territory, from the refugee camps and from Mauritania have been computerized. Thus, as soon as the parties would agree, the detailed programme of identification could be extended to cover all persons in Laayoune as well as those currently residing outside the Territory.

13. In my last report (S/1995/404), I noted that attachment to a maximum of 150 persons to be identified daily at any given centre, which was originally intended as a reasonable target, imposed an unnecessary limitation. In its resolution 1002 (1995), the Security Council endorsed the recommendation of its mission to Western Sahara which urged that the highest possible number of identifications per day be permitted to take place. Insistence on a limit is still encountered, although MINURSO staff have pointed out repeatedly that the figure of 150 persons to be identified a day is a target and not a limit.

14. Despite calls to abandon insistence on strict reciprocity, recommended by the Security Council mission and endorsed by the Council in its resolution 1002 (1995), the principle of reciprocity also continues to be applied when problems arise in regard to contentious issues on the opposite side, thus interrupting the process also at another centre. These difficulties have been fully described in the biweekly oral reports submitted to the Council since the beginning of July.

15. A core problem in the identification process concerns certain tribal groupings. Of the 88 categories in the 1974 census, nearly all relate specifically and directly to tribal groups. Only three categorizations are clearly different. These are the ones which group under one heading, as if it were a tribe, members of various tribal groups. At the time of the census, these groups were not individually represented in the Territory by a large number of people.

16. In a spirit of compromise and with a view to moving the process forward, agreement was reached with the parties in February on sheikhs and their alternates to identify the members of 85 out of the 88 groups in the census. However, there are major differences of perception between the Frente POLISARIO and the Government of Morocco. Morocco maintains that under the settlement plan, all members of the tribal groups which are represented in the census can apply in order to be identified and to establish their eligibility to vote on the basis of any of the five criteria. The Frente POLISARIO insists that the plan's reference to tribal "subfractions belonging to the Territory" should be interpreted strictly as subfractions, the majority of whose members were found in Western Sahara at the time of the census.

17. The group classified in the 1974 census as Northern tribes (Tribus del Norte) is only sparsely represented in the camps near Tindouf but has many thousand members on the Moroccan administered side. Although the representation differs, there is also a problem with the grouping named Coastal and Southern tribes (Costeras y del Sur). The Frente POLISARIO now considers the "Chorfa" tribal grouping in a similar way. In the Territory, 31,108 out of a total 34,116 applicants belonging to these groups remain to be identified. In the

camps near Tindouf, a total of 3,019 applicants from these groups have yet to be identified. It should be stated that the Frente POLISARIO does not have tribal leaders (sheikhs) for many of these subgroups or individuals of appropriate standing to propose as alternates. On the other hand, it recognizes the right, as spelled out in the plan, of all persons from these groups which were included in the 1974 census, to request inclusion in the electoral roll. With respect to applicants residing in southern Morocco, some 50 per cent belong to the contested groups of tribes. The Frente POLISARIO finds it unacceptable to participate in their identification.

C. Other aspects of the identification process

18. My Acting Special Representative visited Mauritania on 1 August, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Security Council mission that MINURSO should without delay commence the identification operation for applicants living in that country (S/1995/498). He was received in Nouakchott by President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya. Progress and prospects for identification were discussed, including the means of identifying the persons whose applications had been received in Mauritania. President Taya has agreed to establish a technical commission to examine the issue. It is my intention to continue seeking a joint agreement soon.

19. In response to a request by the Security Council mission and in the interest of responsible management, all available staff were assigned to assist with the substantive review of the identification case files in Laayoune and Tindouf throughout the time when identification could not take place. The full data entry for review purposes of 45,316 files of persons identified on both sides since the start of the process has been completed and the substantive review of specific cases is proceeding steadily. Appropriate measures have also been taken to improve security in and around the review offices.

20. More resources have been made available, as recommended by the Security Council mission which urged the speeding up of the administrative decision-making process to enable MINURSO to have all the human and other resources required to expedite its work (S/1995/498).

21. The Government of Algeria has given its consent to the extension of the landing time of United Nations aircraft on its territory from 1700 to 1900 hours GMT. It has also granted permission for twice-weekly helicopter overflight to and from the remote Dakhla camp. I am grateful for these measures taken by Algeria, which have eased some of the logistic problems and contributed greatly to the smoother conduct of identification.

22. Two additional observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) arrived in the mission area before the end of June. Ten representatives of OAU are now present to observe the process. Cooperation between MINURSO and OAU continues to be good.

III. OTHER ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE FULFILMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN

23. In its resolution 1002 (1995), the Security Council requested me to report on progress achieved in important aspects of the plan, including the reduction of forces, the confinement of troops, the release of political prisoners and detainees and the code of conduct.

Reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory

24. In September, I intend to address a letter to the Government of Morocco requesting it to provide information on the strength and location of its military forces in the Territory, with a plan and timetable for their reduction to the agreed level of 65,000 all ranks. Morocco has recently reiterated its commitment to reduce its troops to the agreed level at the appropriate time in accordance with the plan.

Confinement of troops in designated locations

25. As noted in my last report (S/1995/404), during consultations held by the former Special Representative in 1991, the Frente POLISARIO had objected to the suggestion that its troops be confined outside the Territory, while Morocco had refused to agree that the POLISARIO troops be confined in the area between the sandwall (berm) and the international border of Western Sahara. In a letter addressed to me by Mr. Filali on 23 August, Morocco reiterated its objection. Consultations will continue with the parties and neighbouring countries, on the basis of which I hope to be in a position to reach a decision soon.

Independent jurist and release of political prisoners and detainees

26. On 21 July, the independent jurist, Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas, travelled to Rabouni to meet with the Chairman of the Identification Commission and other senior officials of the Frente POLISARIO. The following day, he met in Rabat with the legal adviser to the Government of Morocco and senior officials of the Ministry of Interior. Both meetings, which took place in the presence of my Acting Special Representative, focused on the mandate and programme of work of the independent jurist. He is at present compiling relevant material and expects to visit the mission area again during mid-September.

Exchange of prisoners of war

27. As noted in my last report, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is prepared to start working on the release of prisoners of war (POWs) as soon as the parties are ready to do so. My Acting Special Representative has been involved in consultations with both parties. They have expressed their readiness to address all questions relating to the agreement on the exchange of prisoners, in accordance with the plan.

Code of conduct

28. The code of conduct was finalized and sent to the two parties on 17 August 1995. The Frente POLISARIO replied in writing on 22 August and the

Government of Morocco responded verbally on 24 August. Both sides indicated their inability to accept the code of conduct as submitted to them. I intend therefore to undertake a further revision of the code.

Return of refugees, other Western Saharans and members of the Frente POLISARIO entitled to vote

29. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has continued preparations for the repatriation of refugees after the start of the transitional period. UNHCR officers have been deployed in Laayoune and Tindouf to determine the logistic requirements for repatriation and to coordinate UNHCR activities in the region. To this end, UNHCR has undertaken reconnaissance missions to potential repatriation sites in the Territory.

30. As a follow-up to the UNHCR visit of last February, a technical team of water experts from the non-governmental organization Action internationale contre la faim (AICF) arrived in Laayoune at the beginning of June for three weeks. The team evaluated the water resources in the Territory, especially in the potential repatriation sites, in order to define a programme of supply of potable water to returnees. Work on water installations will be carried out by AICF in the coming months under a contract with UNHCR. For planning purposes, UNHCR intends to proceed with a pre-registration of refugees before completing its preparatory work. Both sides have cooperated with the efforts of UNHCR and pledged their support to the smooth repatriation of refugees after the start of the transitional period.

IV. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE ASPECTS

Military component

31. As of 31 August 1995, the military component of MINURSO, headed by the Force Commander, Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium), totalled 285 personnel, comprising 237 military observers and 48 military support personnel (see annex II to the present report). As noted in my previous reports, pending the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for the commencement of the transitional period, the military mandate of MINURSO remains restricted to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, which came into effect on 6 September 1991 (see map in annex III).

32. During the reporting period, the cease-fire was violated on two occasions. One violation was related to an attempt by the Frente POLISARIO to restrict the movement of MINURSO military observers. This violation was resolved after discussions with the Mission and, as a result, MINURSO continues to enjoy full freedom of movement. The second violation was related to the conduct of live-fire exercises and the movement of troops and equipment by the Frente POLISARIO. During the period under review, the Frente POLISARIO reported three Moroccan overflights, which MINURSO was not able to confirm. In this connection, it should be noted that the alleged overflights occurred in the vicinity of international air corridors.

33. Owing to extensive use in extremely harsh conditions over a four-year period, the vehicles, generators, weather havens and communications equipment of MINURSO have deteriorated to a point where, in some cases, they are no longer safe to operate. Measures are being taken to alleviate this situation and to provide the appropriate level of support to improve the Mission's operational capability.

Civilian police component

34. The Civilian Police Commissioner, Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe (Germany), completed his tour of duty on 20 August. Pending the designation of his replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Walmann (Norway) is serving as Acting Civilian Police Commissioner. As of 1 September, the strength of the civilian police component totalled 92, from Austria (10), Egypt (11), Germany (4), Ghana (8), Hungary (13), Ireland (15), Nigeria (10), Norway (2), Togo (9) and Uruguay (10).

35. Pending the commencement of the transitional period, the activities of the civilian police component remain linked to those of the Identification Commission. In this connection, MINURSO civilian police maintain a 24-hour security presence at the identification centres and provide technical assistance to the Identification Commission, as appropriate.

Preparations for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength

36. The original military concept of operations for the deployment of MINURSO during the transitional period, as described in the implementation plan (S/22464), consisted of a total military strength of about 1,695 (all ranks). As noted in my previous reports, in anticipation of Security Council authorization of the transitional period, plans for the full deployment of MINURSO have undergone an in-depth review. As a result, it is estimated that a force of about 1,780 (all ranks) would be required in order for MINURSO to implement effectively its military mandate. The difference results mainly from an increase in the signals and engineering units. Given the expansion of the Mission's activities during the transitional period, there would also be a requirement to increase the existing aviation contracted support of three fixed-wing aircraft and three helicopters by an additional three fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters.

37. The concept of operations for the full deployment of the civilian police component has also been reviewed. In this connection it will be recalled that, in accordance with the plan, the task of the civilian police component during the transitional period is to ensure tranquillity and maintain law and order in the vicinity of, and at, voter registration offices and polling stations. This will ensure that no person is denied entry for the purposes of registration or voting. When specifically so ordered, it will also maintain order at other locations where activities in connection with the referendum, under MINURSO auspices or authority, are taking place. In addition, the component's task is to monitor the activities of the existing police forces, so as to ensure that they are acting in strict accordance with the plan, which is intended to secure the organization of a free and fair referendum without military or administrative constraints and to prevent any possibility of intimidation or

interference from any quarter. It is evident that the elaboration of a modus operandi to carry out these tasks requires close consultation with the parties. MINURSO is consulting with the parties with a view to obtaining the basic technical information required. It is my hope that the parties will cooperate fully with MINURSO in this regard.

38. As the Security Council may be aware, it will take at least 13 weeks to obtain commitment authority from the legislative bodies concerned and complete the deployment of personnel and equipment required to undertake the activities scheduled to begin on D-Day. The Council may wish to take these inescapable constraints into account in setting the date for the start of the transitional period.

39. In accordance with the timetable set out in the plan, MINURSO infantry personnel are to deploy to the Mission area one month before D-Day. The primary responsibility of these personnel is to provide protection for the repatriation of refugees, which is scheduled to take place after the publication of the final list of voters, some two months after D-Day. Should unforeseen delays impede the publication of the final list of voters, the repatriation process would also be delayed. Given the conditions of extreme hardship in the Mission area, it would not be justified to deploy infantry and supporting units three or more months before they are required to take up their responsibilities under the plan. I have therefore decided to link the deployment of infantry and supporting personnel to the publication of the final list of voters.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. In its resolution 49/247 of 20 July 1995, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for the operation of MINURSO for the period after 30 September 1995 at a monthly rate not to exceed $5,592,500 gross ($5,096,100 net), subject to the extension of the Mission by the Security Council beyond 30 September.

41. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission for a further period of four months as indicated in paragraph 52 of the present report, the cost of maintaining MINURSO during the extension period will be within the monthly rate as indicated above.

42. As at 31 August 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to $55.8 million. In order to provide the Mission with the necessary cash flow, a total of $16.1 million was borrowed from other peace-keeping accounts. These loans remain unpaid. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 31 August was $3 billion.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

43. In my last report (S/1995/404), I drew attention to the respective concerns of the parties which have impeded the implementation of the settlement plan, including the continuing difficulties relating to the identification process.

There was never any illusion that they would be easily overcome. In spite of the best efforts of those responsible, progress in the last three months has been disappointing.

44. The benchmarks which, in my last report, I proposed to meet by this time have not been achieved for the most part. Both parties have maintained their respective positions concerning the confinement of the Frente POLISARIO troops. In addition, they object to the terms of the proposed code of conduct, despite the efforts made by the Secretariat to reconcile their differences.

45. I do not wish, however, to minimize the results achieved over the past year. In circumstances largely without precedent and under particularly adverse conditions, over 40 per cent of the applicants in the Territory and more than 51 per cent of those in the refugee camps have been identified. In addition, many more have already been convoked, sometimes repeatedly. A detailed programme for the identification of most of the remaining applicants has been prepared. Were both parties to cooperate fully, the process of identification in all four refugee camps and three of the four centres in the Territory (with the exception of Laayoune) could be completed in approximately five weeks. There would then remain, in addition to Laayoune, those individuals who belong to an assortment of tribal groups widely dispersed and thinly represented in any one place in the Territory or in the camps. Special arrangements would have to be made in cooperation with the parties to group those people for identification.

46. However, the identification process can continue and be expanded to cover all applicants within and outside the Territory, including the 14,500 in Mauritania and the 5,000 in the Tindouf area outside the camps, as well as those living in southern Morocco, only if two partly related issues are resolved: the Frente POLISARIO dismisses categorically the 100,000 applications from persons living outside the Territory in southern Morocco and has major reservations about members of certain tribal groupings also in the Territory, namely the "Tribus del Norte", "Costeras y del Sur" and "Chorfa". From among these, they reject three groups as in no sense "belonging to the Territory". With respect to other groups, while not contesting the right of their members who were included in the census to be identified, the Frente POLISARIO has agreed to participate in identification on the assumption that the number would be modest and the individuals would be identified by one tribal leader (sheikh) from each side. This is a matter which it believes should be resolved between the parties.

47. The Government of Morocco, on the other hand, is insistent that there should be no discrimination between applicants, irrespective of whether they are currently residing in or outside the Territory and irrespective of the criterion under which they apply to be included in the electoral roll.

48. MINURSO has an obligation to consider all applications which have been correctly submitted. The essence of the identification process is, firstly, to establish the personal identity of the applicant and, secondly, to determine whether he or she qualifies for inclusion in the electoral roll under one of the five eligibility criteria. Bringing a person to be identified does not prejudge the decision.

49. Technically, there would be no obstacle to organizing identification sessions in various places within or outside the Territory, wherever the bulk of the applicants reside. The practice could continue of calling on two tribal leaders (sheikhs) from the tribal subgroup concerned, but these would not invariably be drawn one from each side, as has been the practice hitherto. Were identification to take place without the participation of tribal leaders (sheikhs) from the Frente POLISARIO side, it would be necessary, for the process to have credibility, to insist on the submission of documentary evidence, such as a birth certificate, to establish that the individual is indeed the child of a Saharan father, and some supporting evidence as to the father's birth in the Territory. The Frente POLISARIO would, of course, be invited to observe the proceedings and to submit its observations in accordance with the agreed procedures. OAU should also be represented and the presence of its observers would be an important element. If such a programme could be implemented, there would be no practical reasons why the identification of persons living outside as well as those from the camps and the Territory could not be completed in approximately four months.

50. Despite repeated calls on the parties by the Security Council and myself to permit the process to advance more rapidly, both sides are reluctant to compromise on any issue which they believe could weaken their own position. It is now essential to move beyond what has already been achieved. I therefore appeal to the parties to make every effort to permit the expeditious implementation of the settlement plan in order to reach the just and lasting solution to the question of Western Sahara to which the United Nations is committed.

51. The Security Council has already warned that the process cannot continue indefinitely. However, premature withdrawal of MINURSO would undoubtedly have very grave and far-reaching implications for the parties and for the whole subregion. If at all possible, that must be avoided.

52. I propose the extension of MINURSO's mandate until 31 January 1996. If, before then, the conditions necessary for the start of the transitional period are not in place, I shall present the Security Council with alternative options for consideration, including the possibility of MINURSO's withdrawal.

53. In conclusion, I should like to express my appreciation to the OAU observers for their important role in the process and to my Acting Special Representative for his commitment and perseverance.

Annex I

STATUS PER IDENTIFICATION CENTRE

As of 17 August 1995

Shaded areas represent applicants convoked.

Territory of Western Sahara

Laayoune (52,235)

Boujdour (7,259)

Smara (13,506)



Dakhla (10,005)

Total Territory (83,005)

Refugee Camps near Tindouf

El Aaiun Camp (10,449)

Auserd Camp (7,943)

Smara Camp (10,408)

Dajla Camp (7,859)

Total Camps (36,659)

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Annex II

Composition of MINURSO military component

A. Military observers

Argentina	6
Austria	4
Bangladesh	7
Belgium	1
China	20
Egypt	12
El Salvador	2
France	27
Ghana	6
Greece	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	14
Ireland	9
Italy	6
Kenya	10
Korea	2
Malaysia	15
Nigeria	4
Pakistan	5
Poland	2
Russian Federation	28
Tunisia	9
Uruguay	15
United States of America	30
Venezuela	1
Total	237

B. Military support personnel

(i) Medical Unit: Republic of Korea	40
(ii) Clerical: Ghana	8
Total	48
Grand total	285

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 28 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 8 September 1995 from the representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles signed on 8 September 1995 at Geneva by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and witnessed by representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia (see annexes I and II).

We would be grateful if you would have the present document circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) Tono EITEL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Germany to the United Nations

(Signed) Sergei V. LAVROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to
the United Nations

(Signed) Sir John WESTON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom to the
United Nations

(Signed) Edward W. GNEHM
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the United States of America

* A/50/150.

ANNEX I

Joint statement signed on 8 September 1995 at Geneva

We have just concluded a meeting, held under the auspices of the Contact Group, of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Republic of Croatia (Croatia) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia).

The Contact Group announces today that the three Foreign Ministers, speaking for their Governments - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Republic of Croatia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint delegation - have authorized us to issue the attached Agreed Basic Principles. All three Governments - and their Presidents - agree that these principles will govern the difficult negotiations to come, and all agreed, after some tough discussions, to the exact words of this important statement. With regard to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem, the Co-Chairmen are committed to a solution as part of an overall peace settlement and will make it a top priority when they return to the region next week.

The statement takes us an important step closer to peace. Yet, important as it is, this statement does not constitute the end of the tragedy in the Balkans. Far from it. Significant differences exist between the sides - differences that will require continued intense negotiations. We will return to our respective capitals tonight for consultations. Next week Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt will return to the region with their delegations, and tomorrow First Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation will go to Belgrade.

The Contact Group will meet again at Geneva next week at the Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. Subsequent meetings will be held in Moscow and in an expanded format in Rome. Following yesterday's important meeting in Paris, we have also been consulting closely with the representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and will continue to do so within an institutionalized coordinating structure.

The statement we are issuing today is an important milestone in the search for peace. Today's statement contains many significant points. Within its current internationally recognized borders, it is agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be comprised of two democratic entities, the existing Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republica Srpska. Bosnian territory will be divided - the Federation with 51 per cent and the Serbian entity with 49 per cent. They also agreed today to create a commission to enforce accepted international human rights standards within their territories. They agreed to allow freedom of movement within Bosnia's borders and allow displaced persons to return to their homes. Each entity will be self-governing, with its own constitution. While the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue, additional joint institutions at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina are envisioned.

Clearly much remains to be done. The hardest work still lies ahead. The entities have yet to develop a design for a central connecting structure to oversee the agreed cooperative efforts and to elaborate other joint efforts in areas where cooperation is the only way to solve common problems. In addition, the parties need to define their internal borders within Bosnia in accordance with the 51-49 principle. We should be under no illusions that these will be easy tasks; they can be solved only through intense negotiations backed by a genuine desire to achieve peace. Finally, any agreement must be implemented by all sides, and this could be the hardest part.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina); H.E. Mr. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia); and H.E. Mr. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

ANNEX II

Agreed Basic Principles signed on 8 September 1995 at Geneva

Text of principles agreed to Friday at Geneva as the basis for talks on ending the war in Bosnia:

Agreed Basic Principles

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; and (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities.

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.